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THE RECOVERY OF THE HUMAN 
by Konstantin Kolenda 
In the introduction to his Collected Papers Gilbert Ryle says the following: 
"To elucidate the thoughts of a philosopher we need to find the answer not 
only to the question 'What were his intellectual worries?' but, before that 
question and after that question 'What was his overriding Worry?"' In this 
paper I want to ask: What was Ryle's overriding Worry? The publication of 
his Collected Papers helps to come closer to a correct answer to this question 
and enables us to see Ryle's central work, The Concept of Mind, in a clearer 
perspective. Because that work concentrates heavily on undermining the 
theory of mind as a "ghost in the machine," one may overlook Ryle's simulta- 
neous rejection of a theory which construes mind on a mechanical model. 
Indeed, some critics of Ryle tended to see in his own characterization of mind 
some sort of behaviorist theory. As I see it, Ryle was equally opposed to 
viewing the human mind as a ghost as he was opposed to viewing it as a 
machine. The overriding Worry in a11 of his philosophy has been how to avoid 
both Duplicationism and Reductionism in our theorizing about the mind. 
This job is difficult because both tendencies have been most pertinacious in 
the history of philosophy up to and including the present. Both lead to gross 
distortions of what we, in our bones, know the mind to be. Duplicationism, 
from Plato through Descartes to phenomenology, has had many forms but 
always leads to the postulation of some shadowy realm of nonmaterial, inde- 
pendently existing objects of thought. Reductionism, from Democritus 
through Hobbes to J. B. Watson to B. F. Skinner and to those who claim 
that machines can think, makes the opposite mistake of denying or ignoring 
some central aspects of mental life. Ryle realized that both tendencies are 
bound to result in off-center philosophies, leaving behind or distorting what 
is characteristically human. His overriding Worry and his philosophical labors 
were dedicated to bringing us back to what we all can recognize as constitut- 
ing our familiar human reality. This is why I am inclined to argue that Ryle, 
perhaps more than any other single contemporary philosopher, has con- 
tributed to the recovery of the human. 
Mr. Kolenda is Professor of Philosophy at Rice University. 
RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
I 
The search for a correct account of human experience has always been 
accompanied by a parallel or concomitant question: What is philosophy? The 
answer to which Ryle has gradually worked his way, learning from and 
frankly acknowledging his indebtedness to other philosophers-Russell, 
Frege, Brentano, Husserl, and, above all, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgen- 
stein-is that "philosophical problems inevitably interlock in  all sorts of 
ways."' "Conceptual questions are inter-conceptual questions."Vhiloso- 
phers' problems do not arise out of troubles about single concepts, like that 
ofpleasure or that of number. "They arise, rather, as the traffic policeman's 
problems arise, when crowds of conceptual vehicles, of different sorts and 
moving in different directions have to be gotten under control conjointly."" 
Logical troubles, Ryle tells us in another simile, arise essentially from the 
foreign relations of sayables, not from their domestic constitutions. He credits 
Wittgenstein with having led the way to this view of the nature of philosophy. 
For it was Wittgenstein who, both in the Tractatus and in his later work, 
enjoined us to pay deliberate attention to what can and what cannot be said, 
or what our prior and established conceptual commitments logically forbid 
us to say. 
When deliberate attention is paid to what can and what cannot be mean- 
ingfully said about human beings, some persistent traditional ways of 
describing them will be shown to be arbitrary or nonsensical. One such way 
is what Ryle calls the "Department Store" theory, or the theory of separate 
but interacting faculties, such as cognition, feeling, and will. The "Department 
Store" theory, whatever its particular mode, tends to break up the human 
reality into elements, ingredients, or factors. One of the chief logical troubles 
with this kind of theory is that, given its mechanical or chemical model, it 
is wedded to a causal account about the relationships among these various 
"ingredients." 
At least a decade before the publication of The Concept of Mind, Ryle 
believed that it is a fundamental error to set up arbitrary fences between 
thinking, feeling, and willing. In the paper entitled "Conscience and Moral 
Convictions" published in 1940, he argued that "saying readily and doing 
readily seem to be related as species to genus, not as coordinate species of 
a higher genus." A person who accepts a rule or a principle is being disposed 
to behave in accordance with it. "To 'know' a rule of conduct is to be regulated 
in one's conduct." ' A person who knows the rules of grammar or of arithmetic 
does not think of these rules when he is applying them correctly and skillfully. 
He need not even be able to spell out or describe these rules in order to know 
how to apply them. This is why knowing how has logical precedence over 
knowing that. When we reverse the order and insist that all uses of intelligence 
presuppose a "knowledge that" we are easily led into the trap of duplica- 
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tionism and produce pseudo-causal accounts of human action. To avoid this 
trap we should recognize that my knowing a rule does not cause but consists 
in my tendency to feel certain feelings and to enact certain actions. The 
dispositions to feel certain emotions and to perform certain actions shouId 
be regarded not as mere symptoms but as the criteria of belief and knowl- 
edge.' This does not mean, however, that "thinking," "feeling," and "doing" 
are synonymous. The thinking may be described as judicious or careless, the 
feeling as indignant or amused, and the action as impulsive or deliberate. 
Different kinds of adverbs may be applicable to thinking, feeling, and doing, 
but this does not show that there are logical gaps between thinking, feeling, 
and doing which should be filled by some pseudo-causal account. 
For Ryle the notion of mind or intelligence is connected with the acquisi- 
tion of certain skills, capacities, and dispositions in which the criteria of 
success or failure are logically indispensable. All learning involves the possi- 
bility of determining whether the learner got something right or wrong, cor- 
rect or incorrect. In The Concept o fMind  Ryle distinguished between drill 
and training. Human learning involves more than mere mechanical habitu- 
ation. "It is of the essence of merely habitual practices that one performance 
is a replica of its predecessors. It is of the essence of intelligent practices that 
one performance is modified by its predecessors. The agent is still learn- 
ing. . . . Drill dispenses with intelligence, training develops it."G In his later 
work Ryle returns to this distinction and shows by many examples that to 
train is to teach and chat "it is and ought to be one main business of a teacher 
precisely to get his pupils to advance beyond their instructions and to discover 
new things for themselves, that is, to think things out for themselve~."~ 
Even at the earliest stages of mental activity a learner is taught to progress 
beyond the simple task to a higher task. Learning to recite numerals in the 
right succession is not yet the ability to count objects, and counting objects 
is not yet being able to add, subtract, and multiply. Saying the letters of the 
alphabet correctly is but a stepping stone to spelling words. But connecting 
words into sentences is not making lists of words, for sentences can be true 
or false, while mere lists cannot? 
Teaching inevitably invites the pupil to make his own initiatives and to 
venture beyond what he has been taught. These initiatives must come from 
the pupil himself, from his capacity as an intelligent being. The teacher can- 
not be the initiator of the pupil's initiatives. "I cannot compel the horse to 
drink thirstily. I cannot coerce Tommy into doing spontaneous things. Either 
he is not coerced, or they are not spontaneous . . . to respond is not just to 
yield."%ven a possession of a piece of information by a person cannot be 
assimilated to mechanical storage. When the builders of mechanical com- 
puters talk of the memory banks of their machines, or of their storing infor- 
mation, they are using concepts radically different from those applicable to 
human intelligence. According to Ryle, "even to have learned the piece of 
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information that something is so is more than merely to be able to parrot 
the original telling of it-somewhat as to have digested a biscuit is more than 
merely to have it popped into one's mouth." A person who has a piece of 
information is "able to mobilize it apart from its rote-neighbors and out of 
its rote-formulation in unhackneyed and ad hoc  task^."'^ When we learn a 
method of doing something or of arriving at some results, we are trained to 
avoid certain specified muddles and sidetracks, and so are enabled to move 
where we want to move. Thus, acquiring knowledge and mastering various 
methods enlarges our freedom. Methods, like road signs, Ryle reminds us, 
are not impediments but preventatives of impediments to the flow of traffic. 
It is the human beings, not the methods they use, that determine what human 
beings do with them or by means of them. 
In an essay on John Locke, published in 1965, Ryle argues that the impor- 
tance of that philosopher lies mainly in his discovering "common sense." 
Locke's prescription was, according to Ryle, "that men should ask themselves 
what are the solidities and what are the frailties of the reasons they have for 
their opinions, no matter on what subject."" We must ask ourselves when 
it is sensible or reasonable and when it is silly or unreasonable to be sure 
or fairly sure of things. Locke's Essay was, more than anything else, a text 
in the ethics of thinking. I believe that this is, essentially, Ryle's message as 
well. He criticizes scientific theories of mind for omitting something that is 
cardinal to human thoughts and actions. Scientific theories, couched in the 
idioms of mechanics, chemistry, hydraulics, or psychology, 
are necessarily silent about thepurposive nature of our doings, thinkings, perceivings, 
etc. It is essential to them that they merit good, medium or bad marks. In our actions, 
unlike our mere reactions, either there is success or there is failure, and either dexterity 
or clumsiness. Some actions are obligatory; others are wrong; some are prudent, others 
are imprudent. . . . Thought is not something that just happens to us and in us, like 
digestion. It is something that we do, and do well or badly, carefully or carelessly, 
expertly or amate~rishly. '~ 
Like Locke, Ryle invites us to be our own examiners-and this is sine qua 
non of common sense. 
It is not difficult to see that the view of philosophy as conceptual geography, 
as close attention to possible category-mistakes, or to what our working con- 
ceptual distinctions allow us or do not alIow us to say, is but an extension 
or rather a form of common sense. Common sense tries to avoid nonsense, 
into which we can fall either by making wrong assimilations or by introducing 
conceptual barriers when these do not exist. Ryle's essays on ethics are partic- 
uIar1y good examples of warning us about the latter sort of error. In "On 
Forgetting the Difference Between Right and Wrong" l 3  he shows that, 
because the connection between knowing the difference between right and 
wrong and having scruples about not doing right is a conceptual connection, 
partitions between the aIleged faculties of cognition, conation, and feeling 
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are down. "Recognizing" a moral principle is "being appreciative" of it, or 
caring for the behavior guided by that principle. This is why ceasing to care 
cannot be just forgetting something, and "a person who becomes less or more 
conscientious is a somewhat changed person." I4 
One should be careful, however, not to read out of the account of morality 
as caring the presence of knowing or cognition. It is there, together with 
feeling and volition. This is why we can put in words and argue about the 
principles by which we stand or for which we care or about which we feel 
strongly. We can also say why we believe the principles are applicable to a 
given situation. Of course, the intensity of appreciating a virtue may differ; 
nevertheless, we still can see or show that we appreciate the same excellence. 
In that sense, knowledge is involved in caring, although it is not something 
which can be forgotten, as a piece of mere information can. Knowledge of 
right or wrong does not go with "forgetting" or "being reminded of." This 
kind of knowledge is not a technique or proficiency which can get "rusty," 
And, to add another conceptual reminder, the loss of this kind of knowledge 
is a change in a person, not just in his information. 
I1 
When Ryle expressed his opinion about John Locke's key philosophical 
contribution to Bertrand Russell, Russell replied: "By God, Ryle, I believe 
you are right. No one had Common Sense before Locke-and no one but 
Englishmen have ever had it since."" In this part of the paper I want to show 
by use of examples that the endeavor to avoid the pitfalls both of duplica- 
tionism and reductionism has been joined by many other philosophers, not 
all of them Englishmen. I do not wish to claim that this was due to Ryle's 
work alone. He himself acknowledges Wittgenstein's pioneering contribu- 
tions toward a view of philosophy which Ryle shares. But although he found 
many of Wittgenstein's ideas powerful, stimulating, and congenial to his own, 
on many issues, both of method and of substance, Ryle is critical of Wittgen- 
stein. (He doubts, for instance, that Wittgenstein's approach to meaning via 
the notion of family resemblance is indeed as helpful as it seems to many 
followers of Wittgenstein.) Regarding 5. L. Austin, who has also influenced 
contemporary thought, Ryle expressed the opinion that his and Austin's 
philosophical interests neither overlapped very much nor were in conflict.16 
It is safe to say, nevertheless, that all three thinkers have contributed to the 
creation of the philosophical climate of opinion in which the arguments to 
which I want to call attention could arise. It is not the point of my paper 
to argue for the relative importance of any one of these three thinkers, but 
I believe that the style and the scope of Ryle's writings have played a key 
role in what I have called "the recovery of the human."17 
If Ryle's view of the nature of philosophy is sound, then it is not surprising 
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that in trying to clarify, say, the concept of human action, philosophers will 
try to show how various relevant concepts go together. For instance, what 
is the relation between desires and actions? Do desires cause actions? If so, 
it should be possible to describe the cause independently of the effect. But 
in the case of action this appears to be impossible, for the description of a 
desire must include the description of the desired action. If so, the two notions 
are logically related, the relationship cannot be contingent. This conclusion 
is further corroborated by the realization that we do not find out by observa- 
tion or by induction that certain independent states, called desires, as a matter 
of fact result in certain kinds of action. Indeed, there seems to be no other 
way of specifying the desire except by specifying what is desired, and this 
one knows without observation. 
If the causal account of desires, motives, and intentions is rejected, what 
do we have in its place? I. A. Melden argued that reference to desires, motives, 
etc., helps to characterize the actions themselves. Thus, says Melden, if the 
motive of the driver was to signal, then "citing the motive was giving a fuller 
characterization of the action; it was indeed providing a better understanding 
of what the driver was doing." Melden adds in this context that if the motive 
were to be regarded as an independently identifiable episode, a Humean 
cause, then citing it could not possibly function as such an explanation. 
Explanations of actions, if we but look at them closely and without a special 
philosophical bias, are not concerned with the supposedly internal workings 
of the agent's mind alone (motives, intentions, emotions, purposes), but also 
with the circumstances of the action. These circumstances are normally public 
and usually involve conventions. Take Melden's example of signalling. If the 
driver is approaching an intersection of a street, his raising of the arm can 
be understood as signalling. But place the same driver in the desert with no 
roads, no traffic, no signs, no other vehicles. What could the raising of his 
arm signify in these circumstances? It could not be described as signalling, 
except perhaps in a Pickwickian sense, or as a nostalgic wish that he were 
in the middle of city traffic and not in the middle of a friendless desert. 
Similarly, besides the point of the convention of signalling, namely, to prevent 
collisions and to facilitate the movement of traffic-of which the participants 
in this practice can be expected to be aware-there are also the purely arbi- 
trary aspects of the convention; with the introduction of mechanical signals 
the action of raising one's arm has become obsolete. At street intersections 
in India, when they are manned by a policeman, the signals are directed at 
the policeman and are performed by pointing motions from the inside of the 
car. In sum, without presupposing or referring to some natural and conven- 
tional circumstances, explanations by motive would not explain. 
Similar considerations apply to explanations of action in terms of feelings 
and emotions. A person's anger can be cited as an explanation of an action 
only because we know what kinds of natural circumstances normally annoy, 
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irritate, or vex. We know what it means to be angry because we know what 
kinds of situation are likely to cause anger. We may not know the particular 
source of anger, but we would not accept just any situation as anger-produc- 
ing. Without needing a general criterion for the application of emotion words 
to behavior, we nevertheless know which sorts of situations explain and justify 
emotional responses. Anthony Kenny's observations on this point may be 
worth citing. "The form which emotional behavior takes is dependent on the 
object of emotion in question. . . . The occasion on which an emotion is eli- 
cited is part of the criterion for the nature of the em~tion." '~ "The language 
of the emotions must therefore be taught in connection not only with emo- 
tional behavior, but above all in connection with the objects of e m ~ t i o n . " ~  
On the whole, there is an agreement as to the appropriate object of emotion. 
As A. R. Louch noted, "We are undoubtedly in agreement in viewing the 
world as containing at least some threatening, enticing, or sorrowful circum- 
stances. And we are in fair accord in our ways of evincing these attitudes 
and judgments."" 
Regarding intentions, Louch's analysis parallels Melden's treatment of 
motives. Intentions do not provide causal explanations. Indeed, Louch prefers 
to say that intentions are "ways of describing actions, not explaining them." 
"To talk of intentions is thus to answer the question what not why."" This 
corresponds to Melden's saying that to cite a motive is to offer a further 
characterization of an action. The only disagreement between Louch and 
Melden turns on the meaningfulness of the distinction between movement 
and actions. That distinction, according to Louch, rests upon the incoherent 
notion of pristine observables. He claims that when an action is described 
as intentional, the description already includes an explanation. An intentional 
description explains an action because it makes movements intelligible.= 
We may profitably turn to Louch also for his analysis of the notion of 
purpose. To him this term is "a general title encompassing motives, intentions, 
needs and desires, and refers to the type of understanding that consists in 
justifying an action by the contribution it makes to achieving or blocking 
some states of affairs."" Thus purposes, like any of their manifestations, are 
not events or episodes. They are characteristic ways of behaving ascribable 
to living organisms. Attribution of purpose to inanimate things is at most 
metaphorical because inanimate things are not aware of, do not conceive of 
or feel the presence of the circumstances surrounding them. Inanimate things 
even lack the necessary sensory equipment which enables organisms to feel 
and to pursue goals. One of the important features of feelings and emotions 
is that they arise in a context of pursuing goals, namely, when the circum- 
stances of action are experienced as offending or enticing, enabling or hin- 
dering, etc. 
Another item to keep in mind while describing actions by reference to 
purpose is that a reference to individuals (or to collectivities treated as indi- 
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viduals) is always called for. In fact, this is another point of contrast between 
living organisms and inanimate objects. To explain the falling of an object 
we only need to cite a general law covering all falling bodies, but to cite a 
purpose is to refer to an individual who has this purpose. His apprehension 
or misapprehension of the particular circumstances in which he finds himself 
must be presupposed in order to identify his behavior as an action. 
Melden and Louch agree that in explaining actions a clear line between 
description and appraisal cannot be drawn. Of the two Louch is more explicit. 
According to him, "Explanation of human action is moral explanation." 'To 
identify a piece of behavior as an action is already to describe experience 
by means ofmoral  concept^."^ Goal-pursuing behavior, rendered intelligible 
by citing intentions and motives, cannot be described without citing values 
and reasons. Reasons are grounds for action. They are principles ofjustifica- 
tion, of excuse, of entitlement. Some social scientists think of values as obsta- 
cles to objective understanding. "But values do not enter descriptions of 
human affairs as disruptive influences; rather, they allow us to describe 
human behavior in terms of action. Inasmuch as the units of the examination 
of human behavior are actions they cannot be observed, identified, or isolated 
except through categories of assessment and appra i~al . "~~To refer to an action 
as intelligent, fair, or foul, is to describe and to assess it. "The man or situation 
is not seen and then appraised, or appraised and then seen in distortion; it 
is seen morally. Value and fact merge."= 
Melden's conclusions are similar, For him the logical substratum upon 
which our concepts of action are based derives from our own status as intelli- 
gent, attentive, and responsible agents.% In his book he is "concerned with 
actions of human beings who are social and moral beings and who are guided 
in their conduct by social and moral considerations in their dealings with 
one another."" Even in situations where explicit moral norms do not apply, 
we nevertheless understand the concept of human action as involving the 
possibility of descriptions in social and moral terms."' 
In his study of historical explanations William Dray arrives at conclusions 
similar to those just examined. "I wish to claim [therefore] that there is an 
element of appraisal of what was done in such explanations; that what we 
want to know when we ask to have the action explained to us is in what way 
it was appropriate." "The normative character of principles of action is 
clearly recognized by Dray. "The general belief that people act for sufficient 
reason does not arise out of definite pieces of evidence in particular cases; 
it is a standing presumption which requires contrary evidence in a particular 
case to defeat."" There is no denying that there are such cases, and when 
uncovered they entitle us to suspend the presumption and to describe human 
actions in terms of neuroses or queer beliefs. Furthermore, statistical, socio- 
logically-determined regularities or empirical laws should not be dismissed 
when relevant, but they cannot be used in place of ordinary ad hoc explana- 
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tions. The point is that empirical generalizations will not suffice. As Dray 
puts it succinctly, "We give reasons if we can, and turn to empirical laws if 
we must.""3 
Dray brings up another point which in my opinion lies at the center of 
the epistemological issues of the contemporary discussion of action. The 
question concerns the status of the "because" in explanatory statements of 
the form: "He did x because of y." Dray correctly remarks that in our descrip- 
tions and explanations "the particular 'because' does not carry its language 
level on its face; it has to be determined by other means." ' The force of that 
"because" is different depending on whether it connects the action with an 
empirical law or with a principle of action. The connection of an action with 
the principle from which it flows is, once more, noncontingent, while its 
connection with an empirical law is external, attributed merely from the 
spectator point of view. Melden7s treatment of the same point is also instruc- 
tive. He says, "What we need to do is to recover our sense of the character 
of our experience of and our thinking about the things we want, because we 
want them. But here the because marks not the occurrence of an event that 
produces such experience and thinking but rather their character."% Melden 
emphasizes the appraisal aspect of such a "because," and on this point his 
position is similar to that of Louch and Dray. Melden also believes that the 
notion of "wanting or desiring, like doing, is subject to rational appraisal," 36 
and that "rationality is as much a feature of wanting and doing as it is of 
thinking." 37 
The main thing to note about this way of looking at human actions is that 
it shifts the emphasis from actions to their agents. The importance of moving 
from the action to the agent is brought out in the comment Melden makes 
on Anscombe's fanciful illustration. Suppose that someone picked out all the 
green books in his house and spread them out carefully on the roof. When 
asked why he did this, he replies: "No particular reason; I just thought I 
would." Melden's comment on this is, "here the words are intelligible, but 
not the man."'Vhis means that not all explanations will make sense or be 
acceptable, and certainly not those which leave us completely in the dark 
as to any possible human interest, need, goal, or purpose. Unless some ratio- 
nale is offered for the spreading of green books on the roof, the understanding 
is baffled. With a sufficient strain on our imagination, we conceivably could 
come up with such a rationale, but the measure of the strain would be the 
measure of a possible understanding. 
Our concern, Melden says in his book, is to learn something about the 
character of both the man and his action. Of an understood action one may 
properly speak as Jitting the person, his character and his motives.39 In his 
analysis of wanting, Melden emphasizes that stating a reason for what one 
is doing aims at eliciting an understanding of what the person might do with 
the thing wanted. And he adds, significantly: "That it does this depends of 
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course on our common understanding of people, and our knowledge of their 
circumstances." ' O  
That actions are expressions of persons is vigorously argued by Anfinn 
Stigen in his article "The Concept of a Human Action." " He states his posi- 
tion quite explicitly: "What we try to understand is, strictly, the meaning of 
thepersoiz, not the meaning of the action, and what in fact I do understand, 
or misunderstand, is the person or his thought and intention, not strictly the 
action." The view as stated may contain some exaggeration; one may be 
tempted to read it along the lines of the Buberian I-thou confrontation. But 
I don't think Stigen intends his view to be read this way. He merely stresses 
the point that understanding actions invoIves understanding their agents, 
which is an obvious corrective to all those points of view which make the 
mistake of wanting to treat human action exclusively from the spectator point 
of view. To do this is to make a logical error, because a reason for an action 
is always the agent's reason, and the question raised in the quest for an 
explanation is whether acting from that reason is intelligible. 
Stigen, like Melden, wants to distinguish between movement and action, 
and he finds the difference decisive because in the latter the attention shifts 
from what is in movement to the mover. Hence, for him, in the analysis of 
"action" the person, or the person's mind, becomes central. Not surprisingly, 
he joins Melden and Louch in claiming that action is "a proper object for 
evaluation or appraisal, moral and intellectual." "Movements are described, 
but not evaluated. Actions are primarily evaluated, i.e., judged in respect of 
their worth." '"tigen also observes that "the great majority of words used 
in evaluating actions serve to pass judgment simultaneously upon the actions 
and the person; they serve to judge the person along with his action, following 
the dictum that one should be judged by one's actions." Some examples: 
"prudent," "clever," "considerate," "gentle," "mean," "vulgar." '' He is also 
of the opinion that in the case of such words the reference to the person is 
primary: a wise action bears witness to the wisdom of the person. 
111 
The conclusion I wish to draw from this collection of reminders is that they 
call us back to the centrality of the explicitly human dimension in all our 
experience; hence the title of this paper. But human agency has more than 
one workshop. The world is not only a subject for science. It is also a workshop 
for our practical efforts in which values and moral norms provide standards 
of appraisal and judgment. In addition, the world can be seen as a matrix 
for aesthetic and poetic experiences. Besides artifacts there is also art, and 
much of human effort, especially in civilized periods, is spent on making our 
surroundings aesthetically pleasing. Here our evaluations and appraisals are 
not any less serious, although under some conditions they may appear dis- 
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pensable. When they are dispensed with, however, when the arts, music, and 
literature fail to flourish, we tend to speak of humanity's dark or barbaric 
ages. "Art" and "merit," as Melden reminds us, are logically related." 
Ryle admires the writings of Jane Austen because she was also a moralist 
who brought to literature "the copious and elastic discriminations" in her 
&aracterizations of human beings. According to Ryle, these discriminations 
had been discovered by Aristotle and rediscovered by Shaftesbury. "Shaftes- 
bury has opened a window through which a relatively few people in the 
eighteenth century inhaled some air with Aristotelian oxygen in it. Jane Aus- 
ten had sniffed this oxygen." IG Novelists before Jane Austen described people 
in terms of the Calvinistic ethical and psychological bipolar vocabulary. They 
reduced everything to antitheses of Black and White, Virtue and Vice, Reason 
and Passion, or Duty and Pleasure. People were destined either for salvation 
or for damnation. Ryle admires Jane Austen's varied and many-dimensional 
vocabulary when applied to human beings. "Her descriptions of people men- 
tion their tempers, habits, dispositions, moods, inclinations, impulses, sen- 
timents, feelings, affections, thoughts, reflections, opinions, principles, preju- 
dices, imaginations, and fancies." l7 All of these words are needed to tell us 
what it means to have a mind, for the word "mind'' stands "not just for 
intellect or intelligence, but for the whole complex unity of a conscious, 
thinking, feeling and acting person." Because of this unity of various 
dimensions, aesthetic vocabulary is often appropriate, as Shaftesbury had 
realized. Jane Austen also speaks of the beauty, good taste, elegance, liberty, 
rectitude, harmony, or integrity of a mind. "Jane Austen's people are, nearly 
always, alive all over, all through and all round, displaying admirably or 
amusingly or deplorably proportioned mixtures of all the colors that there 
are, save pure White and pure Black."'" 
Ryle's essay on Jane Austen is an illustration of the positive doctrine pro- 
pounded in his Concept of Mind, where he invites us to move away from the 
abstract view spawned by psychologists and speculative epistemologists 
toward a full-blooded study of the workings of man's mind. Examples of such 
studies, he tells us in that book, can be found in the works of "economists, 
criminologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and sociologists, by teach- 
ers, examiners, detectives, biographers, historians, and players of games, by 
strategists, statesmen, employers, confessors, parents, lovers, and  novelist^."'^ 
This invitation to examine carefully the concrete ways in which the human 
agency can manifest itself calls also for paying attention to some subtle yet 
important differences between "explanation" and "understanding." When 
the focus of our interest is a human action, what is called for is not so much 
explanation as understanding. "Explanation" is not quite felicitous because, 
like "excuse," it is usually asked for when there is a presumption that some- 
thing is untoward or has gone wrong. "Explain yourself!" is a locution 
reserved for naughty boys and shady characters. Understanding, on the other 
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hand, calls for some degree of empathy, sharing, trying to see the situation 
from the agent's point of view. I can understand that he boasted from vanity, 
because I myself am not immune from that disposition. In his comment on 
Ryle's views, Anthony Kenny states as follows. "Being told that a man acted 
out of vanity helps us to understand his action not because (as Ryle thought) 
we say to ourselves 'Yes, of course, he often acts like that,' but because we 
say to ourselves 'Yes, of course, men often act llke that."'" Explanation 
which deals with actions, Louch suggests, must attend, among other things, 
to the audience to whom it is offered.52 Dray concludes that "when we give 
an explanation in terms of the purpose which guided the action, the problem 
which it intended to resolve, the principle which it applied, etc., we adopt 
the standpoint from which the action was done: the standpoint of the agent. 
In adopting this standpoint, the investigator appreciates the agent's problem, 
and appraises his response to it."'" 
It  may be worth remembering in this connection Wittgenstein's suggestions 
that the reality of other persons' presence, of their pains or intentions is a 
matter of attitude and not of abstract certainty. Louch echoes these sugges- 
tions in saying that "the difference between men and machines is first of all 
a difference in attitude. . . . The machine which cannot make a mistake, suffer 
pain, appreciate a joke, succumb to emotional displays is not going to raise 
problems as to whether we have really created a man."% This remark makes 
it plain that we cannot understand something as an action without recourse 
to some fundamental capacities of our common humanity. To understand 
an action is to recognize it as a natural thing to do, as corresponding to or 
fitting the kind of being man is. In actual situations this is, of course, done 
by considering the intelligibility of motives, emotions, and intentions, and 
their appropriateness to given circumstances. This cannot be done without 
presupposing the common possibilities of men. 
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret this analysis as leading up 
to a new treatise on human nature. Nothing in Ryle's views, nor in the views 
of the other writers discussed, suggests the permanence or essential 
unchangeability of the human form of life. Louch is surely right when he 
says that "Psychoanalysts and psychologists, writers, critics and philosophers, 
cannot in the same sense [that of a physiologist] be said to provide the Linea- 
ments of human nature, conveived as permanent and enduring features of 
man's life, They deal instead in the changeable patterns by which behavior 
is ju~t i f ied ."~  In this respect history, anthropology, and literature are to be 
studied as demonstrations of the variability and creativity of the human race. 
Such studies may enlarge our grounds for rational decision and appraisal 
and may clarify our own customs, institutions, motives, and goals. Moral and 
cultural diversity are not to be deplored, and universal principles remain 
abstract unless and until a concrete contact calls for an emergence of a moral 
community for which these principles become relevant.56 In confronting a 
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different society, and even in studying a different age, we need not and cannot 
"empty" ourselves, as the historian Herbert Butterfield suggests that we 
should. Furthermore, the evidence that the agent or agents with whom we 
are dealing-either in life, in recollection, or in imagination-are not like- 
minded withus has its own important lessons to teach. The interest in foreign, 
including primitive, cultures and societies on the part of contemporary youth 
is indicative of the ways in which different societies can affect and possibly 
transform one another. And regarding the appeal of literature, there is some- 
thing to be said for Thornton Wilder's observation that poets do not neces- 
sarily give us deeper insights but express our more urgent longings. This is 
perhaps why we say that the artists and poets are ahead of the rest of us; 
they sense the direction which our still unarticulated longings are taking, and 
they use their special talents and their respective art forms to articulate these 
longings for us. 
Dray agrees with W. H. Walsh, his coworker in the vineyard of the philoso- 
phy of history, that "the most important generalizations used in an historian's 
explanations do not come from any of the sciences; they are fundamental 
judgments about human nature."" He also quotes approvingly Walsh's con- 
clusion that historical explanations are "judgments about the characteristic 
responses human beings made to the various challenges set them in the course 
of their lives, whether by the natural conditions in which they live, or by their 
fellow beings.":' Although Dray makes here a reference to human nature, 
neither his nor Walsh's account needs to be wedded to a static interpretation 
of that nature. Indeed, as we have just noted, among the challenges facing 
all human agents are those set by changing natural conditions and by other 
fellow beings, including those who live-in our age of instant communica- 
tion-in foreign cultures and in remote parts of the globe. Mutual under- 
standing is more likely to occur if behind the actions of others we try to see 
attempts to realize, in their ways and in their circumstances, intelligible alter- 
natives of being human. 
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